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PRISON LAW 
CASEY v. LEWIS: THE LEGAL 
BURDEN IS RAISED; THE 
PHYSICAL BARRIER IS SPARED 
. 
SONG HILL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Casey v. Lewis,l the Ninth Circuit held that a 
prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment rights o( meaningful ac-
cess to the courts are not violated when he2 is prohibited 
from contact visitation with his attorney under an Arizona 
prison regulation.3 
* J.D. 1994, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
Ms. Hill is a staff attorney with the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. 
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent court 
policy or the views of any of the judges. 
The author wishes to thank Professor Joan Howarth for her valuable advice and 
contributions. The author would also like to thank Mark Figueiredo, Maureen 
McTague, Scott Baker, and the Law Review editorial staff at Golden Gate University 
School of Law, for their assistance in preparing this article for publication. 
1. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (opinion by Farris, J., joined 
by Goodwin, J.; partial concurrence and partial dissent by Pregerson, J.). 
2. The male and female pronouns will be used alternately throughout this 
Note in reference to the prisoner. 
3. The Arizona non-contact visitation policy provides that, "[t]he following 
inmate population shall have non-contact visits: Special Management Unit, 
Alhambra Reception Center, and inmates in lock down status or as designated by 
the Warden." See Casey, 4 F.3d at 1526 n.l (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
A non-contact visit is a "visit between an inmate and his visitor that is 
conducted without any physical contact and with a physical barrier between them." 
1 
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The Ninth Circuit requires prisoners to demonstrate the 
unreasonableness of a prison regulation which infringes 
upon their constitutional rights.4 Further, the court ap-
proves an adequate law library as an alternative to attor-
ney-client visits to satisfy a prisoner's Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of meaningful access to the courts,5 discounting 
counsel's indispensable services to a prisoner.6 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Prisoners housed at certain Arizona Department of 
Corrections (hereinafter "ADOC") facilities are barred from 
contact visits with their attorneys under an ADOC policy.7 
The prisoners housed in these facilities range from newcom-
ers6 to death row inmates9 and are classified at different 
security levels. lo 
[d. at 1526 (citing Ariz. Admin. Code § R5-1-101(10)). 
In Casey, prisoners at an Arizona prison facility also challenged, under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the prison policy prohibiting prisoners infected with human 
immunodeficiency virus from food service employment. The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the inmates lacked standing to challenge the food service policy. [d. at 1524. 
Judge Pregerson concurred in the majority's disposition of this issue. [d. at 1525. 
This Note will not address the food service policy. 
4. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1520. 
5. [d. at 1521-22. 
6. See infra note 157 for a discussion on the distinction between a prisoner's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecution and an attorney's assis-
tance in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
7. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1993). The non-contact 
visitation policy is implemented in the Special Management Unit [hereinafter 
"SMU"J, Cellblock 6 [hereinafter "CB6"), the Alhambra Reception Center, and any 
lock-down unit. [d.; see supra note 3 for the relevant part of the challenged policy. 
8. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1533. The Alhambra Reception Center houses all incoming 
prisoners, including short-timers convicted of non-violent crimes and more danger-
ous prisoners. [d. 
9. [d. CB6 houses approximately 100 inmates, half of whom are sentenced to 
death. [d. at 1519. 
10. [d. at 1519. When being !:ommitted to a prison, each inmate is rated ac-
cording to his public risk, institutional risk, medical and health care needs, mental 
health needs, educational needs, vocational training needs, work skill needs, alco-
hoVdrug treatment needs, sex offense treatment needs, and proximity to resident 
needs. See ARIZ. DEP'r OF CORRECTIONS, INTERNAL MANAGEMENT POLICY, § 500.1. 
Each factor is scored from one to five with the most important needs scored at 
five and least important needs at one. [d. Arizona Department of Corrections 
[hereinafter "ADOC"J reviews an inmate's classification every six months. [d. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/5
1995] PRISON LAW 3 
When visiting with their attorneys at these designated 
facilities, prisoners are separated from their attorneys by 
cinder-block or glassll or are confined in a caged area. 12 
Attorneys have to confer with their inmate clients through 
a telephone, or by shouting through a small hole in the 
partition.13 Documents, not more than two pages at a time, 
are exchanged "through a narrow wavy slit. "14 The attor-
ney cannot simultaneously review a document with her 
inmate client. 15 
In January 1990, twenty-two prisoners, frustrated by 
the non-contact visitation policy, initiated a class actionl6 
against ADOC's agents, officials, and employees for violating 
their due process rights of access to the courts under sec-
tion 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.17 Attor-
neys from the American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter 
"ACLU") National Prison Project represented the Arizona 
prisoners. 18 The district court granted summary judgment 
11. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1519. At SMU, a cinder-block or glass partition separates 
the prisoners from their attorneys. [d. 
12. [d. At CB6, the visiting area for prisoners is approximately seven feet 
high, four feet wide, and three feet deep. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1526-27. If more than two pages need to be exchanged, a 
guard's assistance is required. [d. 
15. [d. 
16. The certified class consisted of all adult persons in the custody of the 
Arizona Department of Correction at present· or in the future. Casey, 4 F.3d at 
1518. 
17. Id. The federal statute provides that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 
To prevail in a section 1983 action, prisoners must show that: (1) prison 
officials were acting under color of state law; and (2) the officials' actions or regu-
lations subjected them to a deprivation of a constitutional right. West v. Atkins, 
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 
18. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1518. The National Prison Project was formed by the 
American Civil Liberties Union in 1972 in the aftermath of the Attica prison riots 
tragedy. The Project primarily litigates cases involving adult and juvenile 
offenders' Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment and 
3
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in favor of the prisoners and enjoined ADOC from obstruct-
ing contact visits between inmates and their attorneys.19 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment on 
the contact visitation issue and vacated the injunction.20 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. PRISONERS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution extends due process protection to all persons.21 
Prisoners are included, because "[p]rison walls do not form 
a barrier separating prison inmates from the protection of 
the Constitution. "22 
Historically, however, prisoners have been denied the 
rights of ordinary citizens.23 The recognition that prisoners 
retain a residuum of constitutional rights after incarceration 
emerged gradually,24 but not without occasional retreat.25 
usually has 20 to 25 cases in progress at any given time. The Project has eight 
full·time staff attorneys and is headquartered at 1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, 
Suite 410, Washington, DC 20009. The telephone number is 202-234-4830. 
19. Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Ariz. 1991). The district court 
granted the summary judgment in favor of the prisoners on August 31, 1991 and 
amended its memorandum order on September 6, 1991. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1518. 
20. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1524-25. 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Kwong Rai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 
n.5 (1953) (the First and Fifth Amendments and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment extend their inalienable privileges to all persons). 
22. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). See also Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 
225 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is no iron 
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."); id. at 
556 ("Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process Clause."); Pell 
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (recognizing that prisoners enjoy freedom of 
speech and religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Lee v. Washing-
ton, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (acknowledging that prisoners are protected against invid-
ious discrimination on the basis of race under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
23. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) ("[The 
prisoner] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all 
his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him."). 
24. See JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE 
LAWYER, 81-93 (1988) (discussing the emergence of prisoner civil rights and their 
development). Acknowledgement of a prisoner's religious freedom presents an ex-
4
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1. Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts 
Due process of law incorporates "as a corollary the 
requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the 
courtS."26 As early as 1941, the Supreme Court recognized 
that such access rights may not be abridged.27 In Ex parte 
Hull ,28 the Court struck down a prison regulation which 
prohibited prisoners from filing an "improperly" drafted 
habeas petition as impairment of a prisoner's access to the 
courts. 29 The prison's policy authorized parole board offi-
cials 'to review all legal documents prepared by inmates 
prior to filing with the courts.3D The Court stressed that 
courts had sole power to determine the propriety of a 
pleading, prohibiting prison officials from being barriers 
between prisoners and the courts.31 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Supreme Court decisions 
characterized prisoners' access rights as fundamental rights. 
Consequently, an indigent prisoner's docket fees were 
waived when· filing appeals and habeas corpus petitions.32 
Trial records were furnished to prisoners who were unable 
ample. In the 1960s, Muslim inmates' request for special dinner house during the 
Ramadan fast period did not raise any constitutional issue. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 
F.2d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964). Almost ten years 
later, the Supreme Court stated that prisoners shall be afforded opportunities to 
exercise their religious freedom. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 (1972). 
25. Cases from both the Supreme Court and appellate courts in the 1980s 
appear to have curtailed prisoners' rights. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 348·50 (1981) (holding that no Eighth Amendment violation resulted from 
double-celling inmates in sixty-three-square-foot cells, despite that the double-
celling raised the inmate population above the facility's capacity); Evans v. John-
son, 808 F.2d 1427 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that convicted prisoners 
had no absolute constitutional right to family visitation); Jihadd v. O'Brien, 645 
F.2d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (refusing to establish prisoners' constitutional rights 
to wear beards on religious grounds). See generally Lance D. Cassak, Hearing the 
Cries of Prisoners, The Third Circuit's Treatment of Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 19 
SETON HALL L. REV. 526 (1989) for a discussion of the Supreme Court's retreat 
from an expansion of the rights of inmates. 
26. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). 
27. See Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). 
28.Id. 
29. Id. at 549. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 
(1961). 
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to buy them, to safeguard an adequate and effective ap-
pea1.33 Attorneys were appointed to indigent prisoners to 
appeal their convictions.34 Where the state could not pro-
vide legal counsel, prisoners were permitted to assist each 
other in preparing habeas petitions35 or civil rights com-
plaints.3s 
In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Bounds v. Smith ,37 
explicitly stated that prisoners had a constitutional right of 
access to the courts.3S In Bounds, prisoners alleged that 
the North Carolina Department of Correction was not 
equipped with a legal research facility, thereby violating the 
prisoners' Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the 
courtS.39 The prison administration argued that implement-
ing the right of access would create a financial burden. 40 
The Court rejected the administration's argument because 
"the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify 
its total denial."41 Moreover, the state must "shoulder affir-
mative obligations to assure" meaningful access.42 The 
Court decided that either "adequate law libraries or ade-
quate assistance from persons trained in the law" could 
satisfy the fundamental constitutional right of access to the 
courtS.43 
However, the Court cautioned that such a decision did 
not embody the "full breadth of the right of access" guaran-
33. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 
(1963). 
34. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 352, 358 (1963) (deciding the issue under 
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 233-37 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that the state must provide imprisoned juveniles with access to 
attorneys in constitutional and section 1983 claims relating to incarceration). 
35. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
36. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-80 (1974). 
37. 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). 
38. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821. 
39. [d. at 818. 
40. [d. at 823. 
41. [d. at 825. 
42. [d. at 824. 
43. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. In Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 
776 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit held that a prison must pro-
vide inmates with access to an adequate law library or, in the alternative, with 
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. 
6
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teed under the Fourteenth Amendment.44 Access to legal 
materials,45 assistance of fellow inmates in preparing a 
petition or complaint,46 delivery of legal correspondence,47 
receipt of stationery and mailing supplies for preparing and 
filing legal documents,48 and access to legal and telephone 
directories49 all signify diverse aspects of the access 
right.50 
2. Attorney-Prisoner Communications As an Aspect of the 
Constitutional Rights of Access to the Courts 
Communications between an inmate and his legal coun-
sel constitute an important aspect of the right of access to 
the courts. 51 Protected attorney-inmate communication in-
cludes telephoning the attorney,52 corresponding with the 
attorney, 53 and personal meetings with the attorney on 
prison premises.54 
In Ching v. Lewis,55 the Ninth Circuit expressly held 
that attorney-client contact visitation was included under 
the Fourteenth Amendment's right of access to the 
courtS.56 The inmate in Ching was denied contact visits 
with his attorney and had to yell through a hole in the 
glass partition when conversing with his attorney. 57 He 
argued that his right of access to the courts had thus been 
44. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824. 
45. See Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1991). 
46. See Johnson V. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969). 
47. See Howland V. IGlquist, 833 F.2d 639, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1987). 
48. See Gittens V. Sullivan, 848 F.2d 389, 390 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Jones V. 
Smith, 784 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1986). 
49. See Foster V. Basham, 932 F.2d 732, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
50. For a detailed discussion concerning a prisoner's rights of access to the 
courts, see MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 11 (2d ed. 1993). 
51. Procunier V. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). See also Dreher V. Sielaff, 
636 F.2d 1141, 1146 (7th Cir. 1980). ("An inmate's opportunity to confer with 
counsel is a particularly important constitutional right."). 
52. See, e.g., Divers V. Dep't of Corrections, 921 F.2d 191, 193-94 (8th Cir. 
1990) (per curiam). 
53. See, e.g., U.S. V. Stotts, 925 F.2d 83, 87-90 (4th Cir. 1991). 
54. See, e.g., Solomon V. Zant, 888 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1989). 
55. 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1990). 
56. Ching, 895 F.2d at 610. 
57. Id. at 609. 
7
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violated. 58 The Ninth Circuit cited a Seventh Circuit 
case59 and concluded tl:lat a prisoner's opportunity to com-
municate privately with his attorney exemplified an impor-
tant part of the constitutionally mandated meaningful ac-
cess.60 
B. REASONABLE RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
Prison administrators may regulate an inmate's activi-
ties "from sundown to sundown, sleeping, walking, speaking, 
silent, working, playing, viewing, eating, voiding, reading, 
alone, with others.,,61 These regulations can lawfully de-
prive a prisoner of his right to freedom from confine-
ment,62 but may also unduly infringe upon a prisoner's 
retained constitutional rights.63 Courts will intervene when 
the latter happens.64 
1. Earlier Role of Courts Regarding Prisoners' Complaints 
Prior to the civil rights movements of the 1960s, courts 
had kept their "hands off" prisoners' complaints.65 The ju-
58. ld. 
59. Dreher v. Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1980). 
60. Ching, 895 F.2d at 609-10. 
61. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (citing Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972». 
Numerous additional activities may be regulated under an individual state's 
prison policies. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Corrections, Policy and Procedure Manual 
. 318-C, Attachment A (1987) (listing 83 prohibited actions, including quitting a 
prison job without approval, tattooing, sexual activity, insolence, lying, and trading 
property); Indiana Dep't of Corrections, Administrative Procedures, Manual of Poli-
cies and Procedures, Admin. Procedures No. 02-02-101, Appendix 1 (1983) (pro-
scribing 80 types of acts, such as rioting, murder, wearing a disguise, creating a 
dummy, and being untidy). 
62. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980). 
63. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987) (finding that the 
prison regulation violated a prisoner's fundamental right to marry); Cruz v. Beto, 
405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that a prisoner had a limit-
ed First Amendment right to free exercise of religion). 
64. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) ("When a prison regula-
tion or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will 
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."). 
65. Although courts recognized that a prisoner retained certain rights after 
incarceration as early as the 1940's, see, e.g., Ex Parte Hall, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), 
courts were reluctant to intervene on behalf of prisoners. For a general discussion 
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dicial attitude of nonintervention in prison matters is attrib-
utable to the system of separation of powers, lack of judi-
cial expertise, and fear of undermining the authority of 
correction officers.s6 
Courts' attitude toward prisoners' complaints about their 
penitentiary conditions started to transpose in the mid-
1960s.67 However, the courts offered no elaboration of gen-
eral guidance for scrutinizing a prison regulation.68 
2. Wolff v. McDonnell: Development of a "Mutual Accomm-
odation II Standard 
In 1974, in Wolff v. McDonnell,69 the United States 
Supreme Court attempted to reach a "mutual accommoda-
tion between institutional needs and objectives and the 
provisions of the Constitution ... of general application."70 
Prisoners at a Nebraska facility complained that the revoca-
tion of good-time credit71 procedure violated their due pro-
cess rights, the inmate legal assistance program did not 
meet constitutional standards, and the regulations governing 
inmates' mail were unconstitutionally restrictive.72 The 
Court was quick to acknowledge a prisoner's entitlement to 
constitutional protection73 and his liberty interest in good-
of the "hands-oft" doctrine and the demise of the doctrine, see MICHAEL MUSHLIN, 
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS §1.02 and § 1.03 (2d ed. 1993). 
In Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951), the court rejected an 
inmate's challenge of a regulation forbidding inmates from transacting businesses, 
because "it [was] well settled that it [was] not the function of the courts to super-
intend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to de-
liver from imprisonment those who [were] illegally confined." 1d. at 851-52. 
66. See JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 11.4.1 (4th 
ed. 1990); see also, Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: a Critique of Judicial 
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506 (1963), for a 
critique of the hands-off doctrine; JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION 86-90 (1988), 
for a discussion of the factors accounting for the demise of the hands-off doctrine. 
67. See Cassak, supra note 25. 
68. 1d. 
69. 418 U.S. 539 (1974) . 
. 70. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. 
71. "Good time" credit is awarded for good conduct and reduces the period of 
sentence that a prisoner must spend in prison although it does not reduce the 
period of the sentence itself. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990). 
72. 1d. at 542-43. 
73. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555 (citing Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Haines 
9
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time credits.74 But, "some amount of flexibility and accom-
modation" was necessary75 because of "the nature of the 
regime to which [prisoners] have been lawfully commit-
ted."76 Consequently, the Court suspended a prisoner's 
rights of cross-examination and assistance of counsel at 
disciplinary proceedings, in light of the prison's interests in 
reducing confrontation between staff and inmate77 and 
maintaining the "disciplinary process as a rehabilitation 
vehicle. ,,78 
Though driving for a "mutual accommodation" between 
the institutional needs and prisoners' constitutional rights, 
the Court once again failed to intervene on behalf of the 
prisoners and left the final decisions "to the sound discre-
tion of the officials of state prisons. ,,79 
3. Turner v. Safley: Adoption of a "Reasonable Relation" 
Standard 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court, in Turner v. 
Safley,80 granted review of two Missouri prison policies and 
established a "reasonableness" standard for reviewing a 
challenge of prison regulations.81 
The Turner Court struck· down the Missouri prison's 
marriage restriction while upholding the regulation which 
barred inmate-to-inmate correspondence.82 At all Missouri 
prisons, inmates were permitted to correspond with other 
inmates if the corresponding party was a family member or 
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); 
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 
(1969); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 
(1964); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945». 
74. [d. at 557. 
75. [d. at 566. 
76. [d. at 556. 
77. [d. at 563. 
78. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 568. 
79. [d. at 569. 
80. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
81. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. 
82. [d. at 91. 
10
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if the corresponding subject concerned legal matters.83 Oth-
er inmate-to-inmate correspondence was subjected to review 
of inmates' behavioral history and psychological state.54 
Also, an inmate could marry only upon demonstration of 
"compelling reasons to do SO,,85 and upon "permission of 
the superintendent of the prison.,,86 
The Supreme Court in Turner began its analysis by 
enumerating two fundamental principles.87 First, since the 
prisoners retain certain constitutional rights, they can have 
cognizable constitutional claims.88 Second, courts shall ac-
cord deference to prison authorities in prison administra-
tion.89 After reviewing its decisions on prisoners' rights in 
the 1970s and early 1980s,90 the Court formulated a stan-
dard of review of prisoners' constitutional claims: "when a 
prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, 
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests."91 
The Supreme Court identified four factors to determine 
83. [d. at 81. 
84. [d. at 82. 
85. [d. Pregnancy and the birth of an illegitimate child have been considered 
"compelling reasons" to approve a marriage. [d. 
86. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82. 
87. [d. at 84. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 84-85. 
90. The Court discussed five cases: Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) 
(reserving the question of standard of review for prisoners' complaint about mail 
censorship-the case turned on the fact that mail censorship restricted a non-
prisoner's First Amendment rights of free speech); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 
(1974) (holding that the ban on inmates' face-to-face interviews with media was 
not unconstitutional in consideration of prison security and noting that judgments 
on prison security were within the expertise of the correctional officers and should 
have been given deference by the courts); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor 
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (finding the regulation concerning prisoner's labor 
union activities was reasonably related to the objectives of prison administration); 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (finding a regulation that prohibited prisoners 
from receiving hardback books from sources other than publishers, book clubs, or 
book stores was a "rational response" to prison security problems); Block v. Ruth-
erford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (upholding a policy which denied pretrial detainees 
contact visits with family members and friends because prison administrators in 
their sound discretion had determined that such visits would jeopardize the 
facility's security). 
91. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
11
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the reasonableness of a prison regulation. Courts should 
consider (1) whether a "valid, rational connection" exists 
between the prison regulation and the legitimate govern-
mental interest put forward to justify it;92 (2) whether al-
ternative means for exercising the asserted right remain 
available;93 (3) whether accommodation of the asserted 
right will adversely affect guards, other inmates, and alloca-
tion of prison resources generally;94 and (4) whether there 
is an obvious alternative to the regulation which "fully 
accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to 
valid penological interests."95 
Applying these four factors, the Court concluded that 
the inmate-to-inmate correspondence regulation was reason-
ably related to prevention of inmates from communicating 
escape plans, plotting violent activities, and organizing pris-
on gangs.96 Furthermore, Missouri regulation did not de-
prive a prisoner of all means of communication because it 
only limited his correspondence with other inmates.97 The 
alternatives, such as monitoring every piece of inmate mail, 
would require "more than de minimis cost. "98 
The Turner Court struck down the marriage regulation 
which prohibited inmates from marrying unless the prison 
superintendent had approved the marriage upon a finding 
of compelling reasons for doing SO.99 The Court explained 
that an inmate retained her right to marry, even though 
such a right was subject to "substantial restrictions."lOO 
Prison officials' fear of "love triangles" causing violent con-
92. Id. at 89. 
93. Id. at 90. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 90-9l. 
96. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91-92. 
97. Id. at 92-93. 
98. Id. at 93. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has adopted a substantially simi-
lar restriction on inmate correspondence. See 28 C.F.R. § 540.17 (1986). 
99. Turner, 482 U.S. at 99. The Court noted that regulating marriage may 
also entail a consequential restriction on the constitutional rights of non-prisoners. 
1d. 
100. 1d. at 95 ("[A] prisoner's marriage right is subject to substantial restric-
tions."). 
12
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frontations,101 and of female prisoners being abused or be-
coming "overly dependent,"102 represented an "exaggerated 
response" to security and rehabilitation concerns.103 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
In Casey v. Lewis,t°4 the Ninth Circuit followed the 
deferential standard articulated by the United States Su-
preme Court in Turner v. Safley105 and concluded that the 
non-contact visitation policy of the Arizona Department of 
Correction106 was constitutional because it was reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.107 
The Ninth Circuit reiterated its holding from Ching v. 
Lewis, 108 that a prisoner's right of meaningful access to 
the courts "include[d] contact visitation with his coun-
sel. " 109 However, the Ninth Circuit maintained that 
Ching's holding merely began the inquiry presented in 
Casey: whether the denial of attorney-inmate contact visits 
has "unnecessarily"uo abridged a prisoner's meaningful ac-
cess to the courts.111 Without elaboration, the Ninth Cir-
cuit placed the burden on prisoners to show that the non-
contact visitation policy was unreasonable under the Turner 
factors. 112 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed each Turner factor, empha-
sizing the prisoners' burden to prove each factor. us . First, 
101. [d. at 97-98. 
102. [d. at 98. 
103. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-98. 
104. 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (opinion by Farris, J., joined by QQodwin. J.; 
partial concurrence and partial dissent by Pregerson, J.). 
105. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
106. See supra note 3 for the relevant text of the policy. 
107. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1523. 
108. 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990). 
109. [d. 
110. It seems that the Casey majority has used "unnecessarily" and "unreason-
ably" interchangeably. 
111. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1520. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. The Ninth Circuit maintained that the prison officials should not be 
13
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the Ninth Circuit found a rational relation between the 
non-contact visit policy and the prison administration's con-
cerns of escape, assault, hostage-taking, and the introduc-
tion of contraband. 114 The court based its finding on a 
prison official's belief; 116 a belief to which the court has 
accorded "significant" deference. "116 
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the inmates barred 
from contact visits "were not denied all means of expression 
of their rights of meaningful access,"l17 because "adequate 
law libraries" or "adequate assistance from persons trained 
in the law" provided them with alternative avenues.11S 
Third, the Ninth Circuit insisted that the inmates pro-
duce evidence concerning the impact that accommodations 
would have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of 
prison resources. 119 
Finally, the prisoners suggested that, as an alternative 
to a total ban on contact visits, they be searched before and 
after each visit and be observed during the visit. 120 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected the proposal because it did not satis-
fy all of the prison officials' security concerns.121 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the "rational relation" 
placed under "an unduly onerous burden" and that "[a) prison official's concern for 
prison security is entitled to significant deference." [d. at 1521. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (The prison Warden's testimony "demonstrate[d) his belief that contact 
visits between inmates and their attorneys create[d) an intolerable risk of a securi-
ty breach."). 
116. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1521. 
117. Id. at 1522 (quotation omitted). 
118. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that a triable issue remained as to whether 
the inmates' rights of access were satisfied by adequate libraries or other assis-
tance, but refused to remand for trial "because resolution of this factor in favor 
the inmates would not alter our ultimate legal conclusion - that the Turner test of 
reasonableness is satisfied." Id. 
119. Id. at 1522. The Ninth Circuit found no need for remanding for trial on 
the issue of impact of accommodation because "the resolution of this factual dis-
pute in favor of the prisoners would not weigh heavily in [its) analysis." Id. 
120. Id. at 1523 . 
. 121. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1523. 
14
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factor of the Turner analysis was determinative. 122 Thus, 
the court granted summary judgment for the Arizona De-
partment of Correction, rejecting the claim that triable 
issues remained as to the availability of alternative means 
of access, the impact of accommodating the contact visits on 
prison resources, and the adequacy of the prison's response 
to its security concerns.123 
The Ninth Circuit attempted to harmonize its holding 
with its prior decision in Ching that a prisoner's right of 
access to the courts included contact visitation with his 
attorney. It explained that Ching merely demonstrated that 
"rational relationship" was a "necessary, though not neces-
sarily sufficient," factor to sustain a prison policy abridging 
a prisoners' constitutional rights.,,124 
B. JUDGE PREGERSON'S DISSENT 
After depicting in detail the physical condition of non-
contact visits at different Arizona facilities, Judge Pregerson 
addressed several rationales for his dissent. 125 Judge 
Pregerson stated that the majority erred in "allocat[ing] to 
the prisoners the burden of disproving the prison officials' 
asserted justifications for the policy"126 and in "rush [ing] to 
defer to prison officials."127 Additionally, Judge Pregerson 
believed that the majority narrowed the right of access to 
the courts by holding that prison officials may bar a 
prisoner's contact visits with his attorney as long as they 
have maintained a well-stocked library.12s 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 1523, 1524-25. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's sum-
mary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, to determine whether genuine issues of material fact existed. [d. 
at 1518. The court also reviewed whether the district court had applied the sub-
stantive law correctly. [d. 
124. [d. at 1523. 
125. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Pregerson concurred in the majority's 
disposition of the policy prohibiting HIV-positive individuals from food-service em-
ployment in the prison because the prisoners lacked standing. [d. at 1525. 
126. [d. at 1528. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. at 1528, 1530. Judge Pregerson dissented also because the majority had 
15
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1. Erroneous Allocation of Burden of Proof 
Judge Pregerson challenged the majority's view that the 
burden of justifying a prison regulation falls on prison-
ers,129 and argued that the Ninth Circuit precedent "re-
peatedly" insisted upon the prison officials to "demonstrate 
an adequate justification" for the regulation that implicates 
a constitutional guarantee.1SO 
Judge Pregerson noted that although the United States 
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the burden bear-
ing issue,131 the Supreme Court has relied on prison 
officials' presentation of evidence to justify a regulation that 
injures an inmate's constitutional interests.132 
Judge Pregerson read the two out-of-circuit decisions 
cited by the majority as "mischaracteriz[ing] Supreme Court 
decisions."133 In Covino v. Patrissi,134 the Second Circuit 
quoted a long passage from the Supreme Court's decision in 
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,135 to support its assertion 
credited unsupported allegations in violation of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1525. Judge Pregerson opposed the majority's 
sua sponte grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials, because he 
believed a triable issue of the "actual" reasons for the non-contact policy remained. 
Id. at 1540. 
129. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., dis-
senting). 
130. Id. at 1528. Judge Pregerson discussed three cases: Walker v. Sumner, 917 
F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that prison authorities needed "evidentiary 
showing" that the asserted interests were the actual bases for the challenged poli-
cy and that the policy was reasonably related to the furtherance of the interests); 
Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the prison officials 
must produce evidence to justify the challenged policy); Tribble v. Gardner, 860 
F.2d 321, 325 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring the government to show a rational 
relation between the asserted interest and the challenged policy), cert. denied, 490 
U.S. 1075 (1989). 
131. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1528. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 n.12 
(1989), the United States Supreme Court expressly reserved comments on the 
burden of proof issue. 
132. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1529 (discussing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 98 (1987) 
and Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989». 
133. Id. at 1529-30 (discussing Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, (2d Cir. 1992) 
and Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1995 (1992». 
134. 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992). 
135. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
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that the burden fell on the prisoners to justify a prison's 
policy.13G Judge Pregerson contended that the O'Lone lan-
guage did not "absolve the [prison officials] of any burden 
of proof."137 Rather, he believed that the language attempt-
ed to resolve the issue of how great a burden prison offi-
cials should bear.13s 
In Abdullah v. Gunter,139 the Eighth Circuit imposed 
upon prisoners the burden of justifying a challenged poli-
cy.140 Unlike the Second Circuit's reliance on a lengthy 
passage, the Eighth circuit rested its decision on a simple 
citation to Turner. 141 Judge Pregerson found "nothing at 
[the cited page in Turner could] be construed as support for 
allocating to prisoners the burden of disproving the state's 
justification for a challenged regulation. "142 
2. Departure from Turner's Reasonableness Standard 
Judge Pregerson agreed with the majority that the 
constitutionality of a prison policy should be tested against 
the four factors delineated in Turner. l43 However, he 
[d. 
136. Covino, 967 F.2d at 79. The quoted passage reads: 
We think the Court of Appeals decision in this case was 
wrong when it established a separate burden on prison 
officials to prove that no reasonable method exists by 
which prisoners' religious rights can be accommodated 
without creating bona fide security problems. Though the 
availability of accommodations is relevant to the reason-
ableness inquiry, we have rejected the notion that prison 
officials have to set up and then shoot down every con-
ceivable alternative method of accommodating the 
claimant's constitutional complaint. 
137. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1530. 
138. [d. Judge Pregerson advised that "a close reading demonstrates that 
O'Lone merely reiterated Turner's holding that prison officials are not required to 
pass the separate 'least restrictive means' test to justify a regulation." [d. (quoting 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987». 
139. 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1995 (1992). 
140. Abdullah, 949 F.2d at 1035. 
141. [d. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). 
142. [d. Judge Pregerson mentioned that the Ninth Circuit's approach prior to 
this decision was consistent with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Caldwell v. Mill-
er, 790 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying a motion for summary judgment 
based on prison officials' conclusory affidavits). Casey, 4 F.3d at 1530 n.4. 
143. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., dissent-
17
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maintained that by burdenening prisoners with the justifica-
tion of a regulation and by substituting the attorney-inmate 
contact visits with law libraries, the majority "ha[d] , in 
effect, abandoned the Turner's reasonableness standard of 
review. "144 
First, Judge Pregerson criticized the majority's attempt 
"to salvage the prison official's case."145 Judge Pregerson 
believed the majority's finding of a "rational relation" be-
tween the non-contact visit policy and legitimate interests 
was not supported by the record,146 logic,147 or common 
sense.148 Emphasizing the distinction between the defer-
ence due to prison officials' expertise and their burden to 
justify a regulation allegedly in violation of a prisoner's 
constitutional rights,149 Judge Pregerson asserted that "def-
erence does not mean abdication."150 Deference came after 
the officials had produced actual reasons for implementing a 
constitutionally injurious regulation.151 
Second, Judge Pregerson believed that the majority nar-
rowed a prisoner's rights of access to the courts. Correspon-
ing). See al80 supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
144. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1525. 
145. [d. at 1531. 
146. After examining the prison officials' affidavits, Judge Pregerson concluded 
that they lacked both specificity and personal knowledge and failed to evidence the 
"actual reason for imposing the ban" of contact visits. [d. at 1531-32. 
147. Judge Pregerson saw the selection of prison units to implement the policy 
as a reflection of its arbitrariness. Those units affected by the policy housed not 
only the "most dangerous prisoners in Arizona system" but also prisoners awaiting 
to be returned to the community. [d. at 1533. A particular prisoner's security risk 
was disregarded. [d. 
148. [d. at 1534 ("Common sense tells us that family members are more likely 
to pass contraband to a prisoner or aid in a prison escape than are officers of the 
court."). 
Judge Pregerson also noted that although the barriers were erected between 
the prisoners and their attorneys, they were removed when prisoners visited with 
their family members and other fellow inmates. For instance, some death-row 
inmates at CB6 may have contact visits with families. [d. Prisoners may also be 
visited by an inmate legal assistant if they were not so bizarre or hostile to "pose 
a threat to the safety of officers or inmates involved." [d. (citing ADOC Internal 
Management Policy 302.11 § 6.1.10 (1992». 
149. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1535. 
150. [d. (citing Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1990». 
151. [d. 
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dence, barriered visitation, and non-monitored telephone 
calls could not substitute contact visits because it would 
make "the most rudimentary of communications become 
cumbersome and frustrating."152 
However, what was more "startling" to Judge Pregerson 
was the majority's holding that "adequate libraries or other 
assistance" could substitute an attorney's services.153 The 
historical parameters of the access right and the Supreme 
Court's decision in Procunier v. Martinez I54 foreclosed such 
a reading of Bounds v. Smith. 155 According to Judge 
Pregerson, Bounds imposed the provision of libraries or 
legal assistance, in one form or another, as "additional 
measures" to assure meaningful access to the courts.156 
Judge Pregerson feared that the majority's interpretation of 
Bounds, namely that an adequate library would satisfy the 
right of access to the courts, may lead to substitution of a 
prisoner's Sixth Amendment counseP57 with law books and 
152. Id. at 1536-37 (arguing that a contact visit allows attorneys to "assess 
their clients' demeanor and credibility, and to establish a rapport with their cli-
ents."). 
153. Id. at 1537. See also supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the Majority's opinion on this issue. 
154. 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (invalidating a California prison regulation which 
barred law students and paralegals employed by lawyers from visiting their pris-
oner-clients in spite of the fact that the prison had law libraries and inmate legal 
assistance). 
155. 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). See also supra notes 37-50 and accompanying 
text for a detailed discussion of Bounds v. Smith. 
156. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1537-38. 
157. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part, 
"[i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel is limited to criminal prosecutions. Townsend v. Sain, 372 
U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963). 
However our courts have "'constantly emphasized,' habeas corpus and civil 
rights actions are of 'fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional scheme' 
because they directly protect our most valued rights." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827 
(quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 579 (1974»; see also Raymond Y. Lin, A Prisoner's Constitutional Right to 
Attorney Assistance, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1279, 1279 n.6 (1983) (attempting to ex-
plain the concept of "attorney assistance" under the constitutionally protected right 
of access to the courts); Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners' 
Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 
48 MD. L. REV. 455, 472-76 (1989) (discussing attorney assistance in civil cases 
under the due process right to access courts). 
19
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prisoner paralegals.158 
Finally, Judge Pregerson contended that the majority 
had slighted the prisoners' suggestions in its determination 
of no "exaggerated response" to security concerns.159 Judge 
Pregerson recommended that the prison administration 
attach a condition based on a prisoner's behavior to the 
privilege of contact visits.160 
Ultimately, Judge Pregerson averred that the majority's 
position "sets back our constitutional jurisprudence fifty 
years. ,,161 
v. CRITIQUE: AN UNBEARABLE BURDEN FOR A 
PRISONER 
In Casey v. Lewis,162 the Ninth Circuit raised the is-
sue of whether denial of a prisoner's contact visits with his 
attorney violates his Fourteenth Amendment right of mean-
ingful access to the courts. 163 While the Ninth . Circuit 
maintained that the right of access to the courts embraces 
the attorney-inmate contact visitation,l64 its conclusion that 
prisoners bear the burden to establish unreasonableness of 
the challenged regulation and that a well-stocked law li-
brary may substitute attorney-inmate contact visitation as 
158. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1538. 
159. [d. In regard to the impact that accomodation of the prisoner's access 
rights would have on guards, other prisoners, and prision resources, Judge 
Pregerson ascribed the majority's error to its allocation of the burden of proof on 
prisoners. [d. at 1539. Prisoners suggested alternatives to a total ban on contact 
visits, such as searching the attorney, the prisoner, and the visitation room prior 
to all visits; escorting the prisoners to and from the visitation rooms with hands 
chained to waists; and having guards observe the visits. [d. They asserted that 
these were current security measures for visitation and were ready alternatives to 
meet the security concerns asserted by prison officials. [d. 
160. [d. at 1540. Such conditions have already been implemented at certain 
units. ·Contact visits will be suspended if the prisoner's "behavior is so bizarre or 
the inmate's hostility is so extreme that personal contact would pose a threat to 
the safety of officers or inmate involved." ADOC Internal Management Policy 
302.11 § 6.1.10 (1992). 
16l. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1541. 
162. 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993). 
163. [d. at 1520. 
164. [d. 
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an alternative access means is very troubling. 
A. WHO SHOULD HAVE THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFYING A 
PRISON REGULATION? 
The Ninth Circuit held that the inmates bear the bur-
den "to show that the challenged regulation is unreasonable 
under Turner."165 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit places a 
practically unattainable burden on prisoners to establish 
that a prison regulation violates their constitutionally pro-
tected rights. 
1. Deference, Not Abdication 
Judge Pregerson opens his dissent, in Casey, by ad-
dressing the dispute regarding who bears the burden to 
justify a prison regulation. 166 The disparity between the 
majority and Judge Pregerson may result from equivocal 
Supreme Court decisions. Even though it had previously 
mandated that prison officials "put forward" legitimate gov-
ernmental interests to justify their regulations,167 the court 
seemed to retract from its position in O'Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz. l68 It excused the prison officials from "disapprov-
ing of the availability of alternatives" fearing that such a 
requirement would not "reflect the respect and defer-
ence . .. for the judgment of prison administrators."169 
However, the O'Lone court did not definitely allocate such a 
burden on prisoners. 170 The Supreme Court has reserved 
the issue for future discussion.17l 
165. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Covino v. 
Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992); Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1995 (1992». 
166. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1528-30 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
167. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
168. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
169. [d. at 350. 
170. In O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 350, the Court held that the prison officials had no 
"separate burden" to "set up and shoot down every conceivable alternative method 
of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint." In applying the Turner 
factors, the O'Lone Court relied primarily on the prison officials' testimony to 
decide the constitutionality of a challenged regulation. [d. at 351-53. 
171. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 n.12 (1989) (abstaining on the 
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Further, although the Supreme Court urges deference to 
the opinions of the prison authorities in prison administra-
tion,172 it has shown reluctance to rely totally on their dis-
cretion.173 The Court qualified the deference by requiring 
that it be "appropriate."174 
The Ninth Circuit has allocated to prison officials some 
responsibility in vindicating a challenged regulation. In 
Walker v. Sumner,175 the Ninth Circuit plainly remarked 
that "deference [did] not mean abdication" of prisons' bur-
den to justify their regulations. 176 The court deferred to 
the officials' judgment "only after prison officials have put 
forth [justification] evidence."177 Otherwise, the "judicial 
review of prison policies would not be meaningful."178 
2. A Further Confusion 
In addition to. the confusion of who bears the burden of 
justifying a prison policy, courts differ as to what proof a 
prisoner must offer to demonstrate the unreasonableness of 
question raised by the district court's holding that the prison needed to articulate 
the relation between its regulation and legitimate penological objectives before the 
burden was shifted back to the prisoners to show an "exaggerated response"). 
172. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353. The O'Lone Court refused to "substitute [its 
own] judgement . . . on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administra-
tion." Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984». 
173. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-98 (declining to enforce a prison regulation 
which offended a prisoner's constitutional rights because the reasons advanced by 
the prison were "exaggerated responses" to its concerns). 
In the beginning, such reluctance was voiced mostly in dissenting opinions. 
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 586 (1974), Justices Marshal and Brennan 
discredited the prisons' concern of administrative efficiency as "trivial" when 
weighed against prisoners' "fundamental" rights. Justice Douglas, while acknowl-
edging the prisons' security concern was "real and important," opposed granting 
"unreviewable discretion" to prison authorities. Id. at 598, 600. Justice Douglas 
analogized the placement of inmates' constitutional rights in the hands of the pris-
on administrators to placement of a defendant's rights in the hands of a prosecu-
tor. Id. at 601. Justice Brennan, in O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 367-68, explicitly demand-
ed a "firmer ground" than mere assertions of prison officials for a finding of rea-
sonableness. 
174. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. 
175. 917 F.2d 382 (1990). 
176. Id. at 385·86. 
177. Id. at 386. 
178. [d. (citing Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990». 
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a challenged policy. In Pell v. Procunier,179 the Supreme 
Court wanted "substantial evidence" to show that the offi-
cials had exaggerated their response to security consider-
ations. 180 Some observed the comment in Pell as an impo-
sition of a high burden of proof on prisoners. 181 Others 
have interpreted Pell's remarks as a requirement that pris-
oners must prove the unreasonableness of a prison regula-
tion.182 Although the majority in Casey did not allude to 
Pell or its progeny as authority, it followed them in es-
sence, requiring the prisoners to justify a regulation possi-
bly violative of their constitutional rights. 183 
3. An Impossible Legal Burden 
The requirement that prisoners prove the unreasonable-
ness of a prison regulation creates a legal hurdle impossible 
for prisoners to overcome. First, inmates are less knowl-
edgeable about the institutional operation~ than their keep-
ers.184 Although the institution may not be physically too 
sizable to measure,185 it is "a complex . . . of measures, 
all wholly governmental, all wholly performed by agents of 
179. 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding prison regulation forbidding media inter-
views with individual inmates). 
180. Id. at 827. 
181. See, e.g., Matthew P. Blischak, Note, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The 
State of Prisoners' Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 462 n.46 
(1988) (stating that the Pell opinion implied "a high burden of proof on the prison-
ers to show that the restrictions were unconstitutional"); Joseph C. Hutchinson, 
Analyzing The Religious Free Exercise Rights of Inmates: The Significance of Pell, 
Jones, and Wolfish, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 413, 425 (1982-83) (observ-
ing that deference to prison officials' judgment resulted in the placement of a high 
burden of proof on prisoners in Pell). 
182. See, e.g., United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752, 762, vacated for lack of 
jurisdiction, 520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1975). 
183. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit cited 
Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992) and Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 
1032 (8th Cir. 1991) without paraphrase or discussion. See supra notes 134-42 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of these two cases. 
184. Courts have repeatedly held that the institutional operations are within 
the particular knowledge and expertise of the prison authorities. See Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987); see also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' La-
bor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 
(1974). 
185. California has the biggest prison system, which has 8% of the nation's 
population and 13% of the country's prison inmates. Sharon LaFraniere, Influx of 
Inmates Floods California, THE WASHINGTON POST, April 27, 1991, at A3. 
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government, which determine the total existence of certain 
human beings. . . ."186 It is a "separate netherworld, driv-
en by its own demands, [and] ordered by its own cus-
toms.'H87 A prisoner with a 12th grade education cannot 
easily understand and accurately describe the intricacy of a 
prison.188 
Second, prisoners can reasonably foresee that living be-
hind bars will inevitably alter virtually every right enjoyed 
by a free citizen,189 but may not utterly understand that 
the alteration has its boundary and that certain governmen-
tal measures have trespassed constitutional boundaries.19o 
Prisoners are expected to obey the institutional measures, 
not to reason and test them. 191 
186. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (citing Morales v. 
Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.O. Wis. 1972». 
187. Id. One commentator described today's prison as "a policy community with-
in a policy society [which) provides rules and budgets" and analogized the prison 
to a corporation, concerned with "the organization of custody." Jonathan A. 
Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War: American Prison Law After 
Twenty-Five Years 1962·1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 114-115 (1987). 
188. Federal Prison Admissions 
Education Level Percentage 
8th grade or less 17.0 
8th to 11th Grade 28.0 
High School Graduate 50.3 
Some College 4.7 
Other Less than 0.05% 
Median Education 12th Grade 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES OEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, Table 6.86 (1992). 
189. See supra note 61 for examples of prison regulations. 
190. Two prisoners serving life terms at the Louisiana State Penitentiary spoke 
from their experience: 
American prisons are filled with people who are poor and 
uneducated, with a substantial number being functionally 
illiterate. AB a class, prison inmates have very little 
knowledge and understanding of law. They perceive it, in 
a narrow sense, as the power of the system; a power that 
is enforced by the police, prosecutors, and judges. By 
perception they understand that the law is applied mark-
edly different to those at the top of the social structure 
than to those at the bottom. 
Wilbert Rideau & Billy Sinclair, Prisoner Litigation: How it Began in Lauisiana, 
45 LA. L. REV. 1061 (1985). 
191. Certain prison regulations prohibit prisoners from writing, circulating, or 
signing a petition that threatens institutional security, see Idaho Oep't of Correc-
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The court's emphasis on affording substantial deference 
to prison officials' assessments of institutional needs and 
interests would necessarily place the prisoners at a disad-
vantage. While the prison officials need not even offer "one 
scintilla of evidence" to support their belief that prisoners' 
activities would disrupt operation of the prison/92 prison-
ers must offer "substantial evidence" to demonstrate a de-
privation of their constitutional rights. 193 
An application of the Turner v. Safley factors places the 
problem into sharp focus. 194 Turner first looks at a ratio-
nal connection between a prison regulation and any legiti-
mate governmental interest. 195 While being governed by 
certain regulations, prisoners may be ignorant of the 
institution's precise reasons for adopting the regulations. 196 
Even if they are informed of the rationale, they cannot 
rationalize a regulation which injures their interests. In 
contrast, prison officials' perception of the entire operation 
enables them to "put forward" government interests to justi-
fy the challenged regulation. 197 
tions, Policy and Procedure Manual 318-C, Attachment A (1987), and from partici-
pation in an unauthorized organization, see OR. ADMIN. R. 291-105-0015, at 3-4 
(1989). 
"Punishment was at the full discretion of the warden and inmates had no 
opportunity to challenge the charges." TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERI-
CAN CORRECTIONS 385 (2d ed. 1990). 
192. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, A33 U.S. 119, 127 n.5, 
128 (1977). In Jones, the Court deferred to the prison official's opinion that the 
exercise of a prisoner's First Amendment right would disrupt prison discipline. [d. 
at 128-29. The Court reasoned that requiring a high showing would unnecessarily 
burden the operation of the prison. [d. at 128. 
The Jones's Court opinion has drawn criticism. See Emily Calhoun, The 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 220, 234 (1977); see also Comment, The Future of 
Prisoners' Unions: Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 
13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 799, 803-04 (1978). 
193. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). 
194. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four 
Turner factors. 
195. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
196. Prisoners shall be provided with a copy of rules upon entry to the institu-
tion. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 23-3.1 
(1983). 
197. See Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990); see also supra 
notes 184-87 and accompanying text describing the prisoners' disadvantage in 
challenging a prison regulation. 
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Turner next considers the alternative means of exercis-
ing the impaired right. 198 As the Casey v. Lewis court 
maintained, no dispute arises as long as the inmates are 
"not denied all means" of access.199 Thus, a prisoner who 
questions the non-contact visitation policy must predict and 
assess the "alternative avenues" the prison officials will 
submit. Because of the prison officials' expertise ,200 the 
court's substantial deference to the prison official's opin-
ions,201 and the prisoners' lack of information,202 the pris-
oner can hardly prevail. 203 
Third, a determination of the reasonableness of a regu-
lation requires an assessment of the "ripple effect" on pris-
on personnel and resources.204 It is hard to imagine that a 
prisoner can appraise prison resources, let alone their prop-
er allocation. The availability and allocation of prison per-
sonnel and resources are well within the jurisdiction of 
prison administration.205 
The final factor of Turner examines whether the regula-
tion is an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns.206 
198. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
199. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1522 (9th Cir. 1993). 
200. See supra note 184 for a list of three Supreme Court cases which have 
recognized prison officials' expertise in their institutional operations. 
201. See supra note 172 for an example of the Supreme Court's deference to 
prison authorities. 
202. See supra notes 184-91 describing an average prisoner's disadvantage in 
dealing with the legal system. 
203. In 1990, federal prisoners filed 999 civil rights petitions and state prison-
ers filed 25,043 in the United States District Courts. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEn OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
Table 5.76 (1992). In 1991, 4,655 prisoners filed their appeals in the United 
States Courts of Appeals. [d. at Table 5.78. 
According to a Harvard study, nearly all prisoners' cases are terminated 
before any pretrial conference. Fewer than 5% reach the trial stage. William B. 
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoners § 1983 Suits in the Federal 
Courts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 610, 618 (1979). 
The author is not unmindful of the expertise of the prisoners' counsel. How-
ever, a large percentage of prisoner civil rights lawsuits proceeds pro se. [d. 
204. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
205. [d. at 84-85 ("Running a prison is an inordinarily difficult undertaking that 
requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources and all of which are 
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment."). 
206. Id. at 90-91. 
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Turner discharges the officials' duty to "shoot down every 
conceivable alternative method," and charges the inmate 
claimants to suggest an alternative that fully accommodates 
the prisoner's right at de minimis cost.207 However, this 
places an unattainable burden on prisoners, for officials 
may refute the suggestions by enumerating other security 
concerns or technical problems not within the realm of 
prisoners' knowledge. This is what happened in Casey v. 
Lewis. 208 The prisoners there suggested, as an acceptable 
alternative, body searches after contact visits accompanied 
by a guard's observation during the visits.209 However, in 
the Ninth Circuit's view, they satisfied some, but not all, of 
the prison officials' security concerns.210 Some of the alter-
natives, such as body searches, may overstep other constitu-
tional boundaries.211 
4. The Proposed Solution: A Possible Legal Burden and An 
Affirmative Defense 
In a prisoner's action under section 1983,212 instead of 
proving deprivation of a constitutional right by disproving 
the reasonableness of a prison regulation,213 prisoners 
should simply be required to introduce facts of the officials' 
impropriety, sufficient to create a factual question or a 
prima facie case of deprivation.214 The burden should shift 
to the government when the prisoners discharge their duty. 
Defense of the challenged prison regulation or action should 
207. [d. at 91. 
208. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1532. 
209. [d. 
210. [d. 
211. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979) (permitting prison officials to 
conduct body cavity searches of prisoners after contact visits with persons outside 
the prison, but emphasizing that the searches must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner); see also Sims v. Brierton, 500 F. Supp. 813, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (recog-
nizing that the body cavity search, the most intrusive and humiliating search, had 
the effect of discouraging a prisoner from having visits with his lawyer). 
212. See supra note 17 for the text of section 1983 and the requirements to 
establish a section 1983 claim. 
213. See Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993). 
214. This accords with certain Circuit Courts' treatment of pleading a claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 
1983: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 1.6 (2d ed. 1992). 
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rest with the prison officials who can best argue its reason-
ableness.215 
Such an allocation of the burden of proof balances: (1) 
the prisoners' dilemma;216 (2) the fear of the "minor" pris-
on claims' flooding the judicial system;217 and (3) the 
courts' deference to the opinions of prison officials. Since 
the prisoners are only burdened with the factual proof of a 
constitutional violation, they will not be forced to rationalize 
a regulation which they believe injures their constitutional 
interests. Without such factual proof, the court may grant a 
judgment for prison officials.218 
A requirement that officials affirmatively defend a chal-
lenged regulation accords with the court's emphasis of af-
fording deference to the prison officials' judgment. The de-
fense provides the prison officials with an opportunity to 
recapitulate and reconsider the reasons for enacting the 
challenged regulation. This serves as a check on discretion 
vested in prison officials.219 
215. Cf, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 512 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (find-
ing the burden of proof often falls on the party who "has particular knowledge or 
control of the evidence as to such matter"), reversed on other grounds, 426 U.S. 
290 (1975); Trans-American Van Service, Inc. v. United States, 421 F. Supp. 308, 
330 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (reasoning that once the applicant for a common carrier has 
proven a prima facie case, the existing carrier opposing the application has the 
burden of proving such application should be denied, for the "capability of protest-
ing carrier are matters peculiarly within their knowledge"). 
216. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text discribing the prisoner's 
dilemma. 
217. Chief Justice Burger of the United States Supreme Court once stated that 
"[fJederal judges should not be dealing with prisoner complaints which, although 
important to a prisoner; are so minor that any well-run institution should be able 
to resolve them fairly without resorting to federal judges." JOHN W. PALMER, CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, § 11.4.1 (4th ed. 1991) (citing 62 AMERICAN 
BAR AsSOCIATION JOURNAL 189 (Feb. 1976». 
218. The "judgment" refers to any "decree and any order from which an appeal 
lies." FED. R. CN. P. 54 (examples include judgments on the pleadings, under FED. 
R. CN. P. 12, and summary judgments, under FED. R. ClV. P. 56). 
219. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 598 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Justice Douglas dissented from the Court's position that the prisoners' exercise of 
a fundamental constitutional rights should be left within the unreviewable discre-
tion of prison authorities. 
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B. WHAT IS THE VALUE OF AsSISTANCE OF COUNSEL? 
Rights of meaningful access to the courts ensure the 
prisoners with a forum to air their grievances.22o Assis-
tance of a legal counseJ221 facilitates a more efficient and 
skillful handling of their complaints and assures inmates of 
fair treatment and "protection of our most valued 
rights. "222 The Ninth Circuit discounts the significance of 
counsel's assistance when it equates an attorney's service 
with the presence of a law library and tolerates a physical 
barrier between an attorney and her inmate client during 
consultation. 
1. From a Prisoner's Perspective: An Empty Promise 
In Bounds v. Smith,223 the Supreme Court made a 
sweeping promise: "prisoners have a constitutional right of 
access to the courts. "224 The Court further mandated that 
the access be meaningful225 and the prison authorities en-
sure a prisoner's "meaningful access.,,226 Maintaining a law 
library may meet the "meaningful access" mandate.227 So 
may the establishment of some legal assistance programs, 
like: 
[T]raining of inmates as paralegal assistants 
to work under lawyers' supervision, the use of 
paraprofessionals and law students, either as 
volunteers or in formal clinical programs, the 
organization of volunteer attorneys through 
220. See supra note 157 for a discussion on counsel's assistance in prisoner's 
civil lawsuits. 
221. See Raymond Y. Lin, Note, A Prisoner's Constitutional Right to Attorney 
Assistance, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1983). 
222. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827, 831 (1977). See supra notes 51-60 and 
accompanying text for a discussion on communication between attorneys and their 
prisoner-clients as an aspect of the constitutional rights of access to the courts. 
223. 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
224. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821. 
225. ld. 
226. ld. at 828. 
227. ld.; cf. Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 
library with insufficient books or an insufficient allowance for research does not 
provide "meaningful" access). 
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bar association or other groups, the hiring of 
lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, and 
the use of full-time staff attorneys, working 
either in new prison legal assistance organiza-
tions or as part of public defender or legal 
services or offices.228 
[Vol. 25:1 
However, what makes a particular legal access program 
constitutionally adequate is unclear from the Bounds deci-
sion.229 The Casey court's assertion that an adequate li-
brary would solve the problem of inadequate attorney 
assistance,230 fails to further the inquiry left unsolved by 
Bounds.231 
In Ching v. Lewis,232 the Ninth Circuit considered the 
issue of adequate legal assistance in the context of personal 
visits between attorneys and inmates.233 The court held 
that the visits must be "contact" to guarantee a private 
communication between an attorney and her inmate cli-
ent.234 Although the Casey court paid lip service to Ching, 
it questioned the reasonableness of permitting contact vis-
its235 on prison premises and eventually denied the prison-
ers contact visits.236 As Judge Pregerson declared, the 
court's tolerance of a barrier between attorneys and inmates 
"has in effect drawn an iron curtain between prisoners and 
228. [d. at 831. 
229. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832 ("[A) legal access program need not include any 
particular element we have discussed and we encourage local experimentation. Any 
plan, however, must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with con· 
stitutional standard."}; see also Lin, supra note 223, at 1285-86 ("Although Bounds 
seemed to hold that the prisoner's right of access was adequately safeguarded by 
the provision of a law library, the issue of whether attorney assistance would be 
required as an adjunct to the library was not before the court. Therefore, Bounds 
alone cannot resolve the issue of whether the provision of law libraries without 
attorneys is constitutionally sufficient."); Millemann, supra note 159, at 467. 
230. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1522. 
231. ADOC apparently provided attorneys to assist inmates' in accessing the 
courts. In Casey, the prisoners challenged the inadequacy of the attorney's assis-
tance because of the denial of contact visits. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1518. 
232. 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1990). 
233. Ching, 896 F.2d 608; see also supra notes 55·60 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of Ching. 
234. Ching, 895 F.2d at 609. 
235. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1520. 
236. [d. at 1523-24. 
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the Constitution."237 
2. From an Attorney's Perspective: A Frustrating Experience 
In the dim visitation room,23S the attorney is separated 
from her client by a cinder-block or glass partition.239 One 
attorney's summary of her experience best illustrates the 
frustration: 
[T]he steel mesh barrier between the attorney 
and her client prevents much of the subtle but 
important non-verbal or confidential interac-
tions that attorneys normally rely on during 
depositions. The attorney is unable to see her 
client's expressions through the grate, and 
therefore does not know whether his silences 
are the result of some confusion, lack of mem-
ory, or simply because he never heard her 
questions.24o 
When conversing with her client, the attorney has to 
shout through a hole or a "telephone attached to the wall 
farthest away from the partition."241 No conversations are 
private.242 Confidential communication represents the core 
of an attorney-client relationship, because it encourages "full 
and frank communications between attorneys and their cli-
ents," promotes observance of law, and aids the administra-
tion of justice.243 To a prisoner behind high walls, his at-
237. [d. at 1525 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1974». 
238. One of the regulation-affected units has only one light on the attorney's 
side of the partition. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993). 
239. [d. at 1518-19. 
240. [d. at 1536. 
241. [d. at 1526. 
242. [d. Some of the ADOC staff testified that they had overheard the attorney-
prison conversation taking place inside the visitation rooms while outside the room. 
Casey, 4 F.3d at 1527. This was true even when the prisoners and attorneys were 
using moderate voice tones. [d. 
243. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985). 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice mandate that "[a) communication not 
otherwise subject to reading or hearing should not be intercepted except pursuant 
to a court order, or unless authorized by law, when the communication is reason-
ably anticipated to be a prisoner and his or her attorney." ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 23-6.l(d)(i). Although it is unclear whether ABA standards for 
Criminal Justice govern an attorney's assistance in the context of a civil lawsuit, 
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torney may be his only "access" to the courts and the 
society.244 With a prison authority standing in a close prox-
imity and possibly overhearing the conversations between 
the attorney and her client, no "full and frank" exchanges 
between attorneys and clients will occur.245 This creates "a 
chilling effect on attorney-client communications"246 and in-
evitably impedes effective legal representation.247 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Casey v. Lewis248 places an unbearable burden on pris-
oners who challenge a prison regulation violative of their 
constitutional rights. Consequently, barriers as the one in 
Casey will forever stand. New barriers will be erected. To-
day, a barrier has separated prisoners from their attorneys. 
Tomorrow, another barrier will separate them from another 
constitutional protection. As Judge Pregerson warned, barrier 
by barrier, our constitutional jurisprudence will be set back 
another 50 years.249 
federal standards promulgated by the Department of Justice, clearly enunciate a 
prisoner's counsel rights in a civil lawsuit. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS 
FOR PRISONS AND JAIL § 1.04 (1980). Each facility develops and implements policies 
and procedures to ensure the right of inmates to have access to legal assistance in 
civil or criminal matters through counsel and their authorized representatives, or 
designated counsel substitutes. ld. Correctional authorities facilitate access to such 
assistance, including assisting inmates in making confidential contact with attor-
neys and their authorized representative. ld. 
244. See Turner, supra note 203, at 624-25 ("It is apparent that it is futile for 
prisoners to proceed pro se. "). 
245. People v. Barraza, 218 Cal. App. 3d 700, 705 (1990). 
246. ld. 
247. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1537 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
248. 4 F.3d, 1516, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993). 
249. ld. at 1541. 
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